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The Existence and Role of the Barisan Madura Corps, 1831 – 1931

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ABSTRACT

The Barisan Madura Corps is one of the indigenous militias that were originally founded in various areas of the Residency in Java and also in Madoera in 1831. For further mention of Barisan Madura is the Barisan Corps. Although the formation of this corps was not special but at that time the corps was widely used as a native aid force which was included as one of the strength forces of the Dutch East Indies colonial government. The main tasks that must be carried out by the corps were to maintain calm in the community and to assist the government army at the time of the war. In practice this obligation can be carried out well by the Barisan corps on many shipments out of the Madura region in order to assist government forces in carrying out military operations in the framework of pacification in various regions in the Dutch East Indies. In its development there was a decision to turn the Barisan corps into a professional military unit so that it was deemed necessary to reorganize. This reorganization includes many things, especially in the form of institutional reform. Government regulations issued in 1885 at the same time as the implementation of the government system directly in Madura by the Dutch colonial government also simultaneously regulates the existence of the Barisan Madura corps. This corps was subsequently under the direct supervision of the government and had more opportunities to be incorporated into the Dutch East Indies army structure as a sort of reserve army compared to the recruitment of indigenous militia members under coercion.

Keywords: Barisan Corps, Madura, Dutch East Indies, military reinforcements, indigenous population, voluntary recruitment, regional pacification.

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1. Introduction

The political policy that made the Dutch East Indies colonial government must think with consideration was the Madurese community in terms of religion, because it must be realized that the rise of Islam that was rife during colonialism in the Dutch East Indies since the 18th century also permeated Madura even at the level Madura's bigotry with respect to Islam is not in doubt. The religious revival was also thought to be related to the process of Islamization in Madura, both local and global, which in this case showed special characteristics.

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As is known that in the early period of the 19th century the colonial government was holding a regional pacification especially on the island of Java in order to form a unitary colonial government in the Dutch East Indies. For this purpose, a large and strong military force is needed so that to meet this need, which cannot be fulfilled from within the military unit itself, at that time the number was still limited, then a discourse emerged to form a kind of indigenous militia aimed at helping the colonial government in carrying out political pacification and safeguarding security and peace in areas that had been successfully mastered.

The empowerment of police officers, both Dutchmen and indigenous people, when viewed in the context of previous periods is not new because since the VOC's time the need for conducive security situations and conditions was a priority. Thus it is not surprising if this then affects the lives of indigenous populations in many areas controlled by the VOC. Residents have become accustomed to various matters relating to the military world including the habit of using firearms made by Western nations. Although the indigenous population in this case only served as assistants for the Dutch troops or reserve corps, the benefits they gained were the formation of a spirit of consciousness and discipline which was a very important and valuable attitude at that time.

In the previous period, namely in 1757 there was already a legion of Prang Wedono; in 1796 - 1801 a firing force was formed as a city guard whose members consisted of Europeans and non-Europeans; before 1808 there were soldiers as army police, then during the reign of Governor General Daendels (1808-1811) replaced with Djajang-Sekar troops in each district with the strength of one corps consisting of 50-100 horsemen; in 1811 there were Pakoe Alam troops which in 1816 were included in the official Dutch forces as well as the Prang Wedono army (later Mangkoe-Negoro). The Soesoehoenan Solo native assistance force in 1811 had participated in battles against the British army. Previously, there were also indigenous support forces from Makassar, Ternate and Tidore; in 1817 a peranakan corps (Chinese born in the Dutch East Indies) was formed which was replaced in 1820 with Djajang-Sekar. In 1816 Banten had also formed an Ambonese cavalry and escort troops from Solo and Djocjakarta. Even in Timor itself there was also a Mardijker corps around 1850.² In terms of organization the daily recruitment and leadership was in the hands of the regent and all activities carried out had to be under the supervision of a Dutch resident official.³

The Dutch East Indies is one of the countries in the world with the most diverse composition of cultural and ethnic identities, and this pluralism is one of the sources of national pride. This country, inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups and passed on, is rich in regional languages and cultures that have historically been united by the same fate that was colonized by the Dutch colonial government for hundreds of years. Not only colonizing, the colonial government also actively played a significant role in the formation of racial and cultural identities in its colonized societies. The colonial formations were, ironically, by the post-modern state in ways that partly resembled the representations of the colonized nations.

Vickers⁴, for example, paying attention to the capacity of state power, both while still in the hands of the Dutch during the colonial period and during the Indonesian New Order government, to shape and design ethnicity and cultural identity, although this cannot be interpreted simplistically that the state has the ability to forming cultural identities, such as Madura, Dayak, Balinese, and so on. All Indonesian ethnic groups during the colonial period were conceptualized as others. The Indonesian New Order government through various means has continued the colonial assessment of ethnic groups other than Java as other Javanese-centric government identities. Just saying that a similar logic of otherness is used does not mean that politically dominant parties approach all subordinated groups in the same way. The problem that will be examined further in this paper is related to why is the Madurese population in many aspects of daily life considered by the Dutch colonial government to have a different characteristic from other residents living in the Dutch East Indies? How does the influence of political conditions that occur on the existence and development of the Madura Barisan corps?

² Officier-leider, Het Eeuwfeest der Barisan korpsen op Madoera. *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift (IMT)* 62, 1931, p. 114

³ J.H. Abendanon, *Veiligheidspolitie op Java en Madoera* (Batavia: Ernst, 1877), p. 22

⁴ Adrian Vickers, *Bali: A Paradise Created* (Ringwood: Penguin Book Australia Ltd., 1989).

The inspiration for the first literature study was the work of Huub de Jonge.⁵ In this book he discusses the impact of the development of political relations during the so-called indirect government that began in Sumenep and then influenced the government throughout Madura. This paper can lead to understanding the Madurese socio-political conditions from the 18th to 19th centuries. In this paper also explained the position of Madura who is very aloof in colonial society that is different from both directly governed areas and fully autonomous regions such as in regions kingdom in Java (Vorstenlanden).

The taxation system has changed the structure of government among the people. In the beginning, because the housing model was based on the tanean lanjhang system, there was no definite organizational structure in the village. This organizational process is quite difficult to apply, because the tanean lanjhang uses a grouping pattern. Housing systems are grouped into specific clusters based on extended family systems. The elite ruler of the kingdom, in turn, officially appoints a lurah (village head) whose job is to ensure that people serve those who have apanage, for example in cutting wood, and gathering grass to feed the commissioner's livestock. Besides the village head, there are also traditional leaders whose job is to take tax from people. The traditional leader is actually a leader in a tanean lanjhang who is accustomed to leading ceremonies and rituals, called kalebun. The commissioner did not appoint this leader, so that his social status was lower than that of the lurah. Conversely at that time kalebun was used to refer to the title of village head, who was prestigious both as a ritual and as a social leader.⁶

The second study that inspired this writing is the work of Kuntowijoyo⁷. In this book, we focus on the uniqueness of Madura in the history of the physical environment, because it is geoeologically composed of a large portion of typical upland land. This is different from other places where there are fields of fields or fields. The ecology of the moor is considered to be able to form a pattern of scattered settlements, so that it influences the occurrence of very high population migrations, economic structure and organization, individual-centered personality patterns and leadership held by the ulama. Madura's reality was once again inseparable from the Dutch East Indies, especially in the 19th century regarding its bureaucratic structure. The role of the local elite in general is a major factor related to functional practice in society both if there is and bad, as the normative aspect becomes a subjective treat even in historical essays that try to be objective. Ecological conditions are very influential in the formation of socio-economic and even political realities at some level over Madurese society.

2. Establishment of Barisan Madura Corps

The policy that often appears as a formality is that the recruitment of indigenous troops is carried out to meet the needs in quantity only and this is considered sufficient if they are able to fulfill the formation of force units only. Now such things should not happen again and it is time to conduct recruitment must prioritize the quality aspect, namely only to indigenous people who are really good and have the potential to become members of a professional force. This of course will require more costs but the results to be obtained will certainly be even better. Pembentukan Korps Barisan Madura

The policy that often appears as a formality is that the recruitment of indigenous troops is carried out to meet the needs in quantity only and this is considered sufficient if they are able to fulfill the formation of force units only. Now such things should not happen again and it is time to conduct recruitment must prioritize the quality aspect, namely only to indigenous people who are really good and have the potential to become members of a professional force. This of course will require more costs but the results to be obtained will certainly be even better.

Internally, government forces have often heard the statement that the Javanese native army would be a good soldier if it had carried out its service for 6 to 12 years. But are they guaranteed to be able to change their character and character to be more courageous to fight and become more independent? Is the compatibility that they will have after running the service for 6 years to 12 years related to their placement in the garrison, line marching or inspection-inspection and so on?.

5 Huub de Jonge, "Pembentukan Negara Dengan Kontrak: Kabupaten Sumenep, Madura, VOC dan Hindia Belanda, 1680-1883" in Huub de Jonge (ed.), *Agama, Kebudayaan dan Ekonomi*, Jakarta: Rajawali, 1989

6 Ibid.

7 Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940*. Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2002

Of course there is a very good exception which is in the opinion of many people that the Javanese population group is an ethnic group that is appropriate to fill the government needs of members of the troops. And a high degree of intelligence in the political affairs of the Dutch East Indies was not necessary to be able to say conclusively that it could be politically dangerous if the majority of the army members were from the Javanese only and also to defend the most important island in the Dutch East Indies. With the exception of a number of indigenous tribes in our Indies region, which were few or even absent from the Dutch East Indies army, it was certain that the Ambonese and Madurese were gradually becoming more suitable for service as infantry troops.

The Ambonese have shown a very good role during the Aceh War which lasted for 12 years. Their abilities as infantry troops have progressed rapidly and this has been proven on the battlefield in Aceh. In general opinion, officers of infantry troops who also came from elements of the Ambonese people had abilities that were equal to those of European officers. We will be very happy if the formation of the very important Ambonese people can be immediately expanded and refined again.

Barisan Madura was one of the indigenous militias which was originally founded in various areas of the Residency in Java and also in Madoera based on Resolution dated February 12, 1831 No.43. Although the formation of this corps was not special but at that time it was widely used as a native aid force which was included as a part of the strength of government forces. As a continuation of the Resolution mentioned above, the Resident Soerabaja at that time entered into an agreement with Sultan Madoera in Bangkalang, Sultan Sumanap and Panembahan Pamekasan where in the agreement was then agreed upon and strengthened with the issuance of Resolution dated 29 September 1831 No.2. In the agreement with Panembahan Pamekasan it was agreed that a corps of 2 infantry singers, ½ artillery singers and ½ cavalry singers would be established, all named by soldiers with a total strength of 386 people. Panembahan appointed officers and received an officer and 2 lower officers from the Dutch East Indies troops to serve as instructors.

In connection with the Madura corps which was formally formed by the Dutch government to become permanent as reinforcements for native troops, it was based on an agreement between the Surabaya resident, Domeis and the Bangkalan sultan, Panembahan Pamekasan, and the Sumenep sultan. This agreement was later ratified in the form of Resolution dated 12 February 1831, No. 43.⁸ The consideration that caused this resolution to be made easily and smoothly was because in earlier periods between the Madurese rulers and the Dutch East Indies government indeed had already signed a binding contract of consensus ie successively there was an agreement that the rulers at any time must be prepared to provide assistance of approximately 1,000 Madurese troops to the government for the purposes of carrying out various military expeditions to various regions. The main tasks mentioned in the resolution were that the existence of the corps of the ranks was aimed at maintaining calm in the community and to assist the government army at the time of the war.

During the reign of Governor General Van den Bosch, a new view was adopted, namely that since the end of the Diponegoro war in 1830 and the implementation of the forced cultivation system, the role of the district head was very important to be used as a means of supporting both the power and its influence on the people. Van den Bosch revised the policies of his predecessors, Daendels and Raffles regarding the traditional government of the bumiputera. On January 14, 1831 wrote a letter to the members of the Council of the Indies, that for the sake of peace in Java, it was only supported by the regents whether all economic and political interests would be carried out smoothly.⁹ In relation to Madura, the only hope that was believed by Van den Bosch was to think about changing the pattern of government by imitating Java, so that the centralization of command was left to the assistant resident. In addition, he also realized that applying the forced cultivation system, because the land condition of the Madura island was infertile, so he was forced to divert recruiting military units from Barisan and salt supply to be a viable option.

Due to the importance of this corps for the defense and security needs of the Netherlands Indies government, the recruitment circulation became a systemic agenda in Madura. Each member of the Barisan corps during their service was limited to around the age of 38, so to maintain a stable

⁸ Officier Leider, *op.cit.*, p. 114

⁹ B.J.O. Schrieke, *Kajian Historis Sosiologis Masyarakat Indonesia*, Jilid I, translated by Aditya Pratama, Yogyakarta, Penerbit Ombak, 2015, p. 279.

regeneration was only by growing the population's birth. In 1822 the Dutch government had assigned a medical officer, doctor J. Mulder, with the intention of conducting a vaccination program to prevent infant mortality, so that it could support the regeneration of young people who would later be recruited as members of the Barisan corps. According to a report obtained from doctor J. Mulder that the vaccination program was held in three districts namely Bangkalan, Sumenep, and Pamekasan, but in the beginning Panembahan Bangkalan refused because it preferred the more religious methods of traditional medicine. When an outbreak of smallpox was expected to endanger the child in the 1830s, then all regents in Madura received the full vaccination program, so that raising the energy to help doctor J. Mulder as many as 232 people was not getting a salary but getting a plot of fields or fields.¹⁰

The government also set a requirement that the march corps can be assigned to areas outside Madoera. If these requirements can be fulfilled, Panembahan is given a bonus in the form of writing off debts and taxes to the government which he is still bearing and given tax exemptions for several years later. During its development there was a change in the strength and composition of the corps where for the Pamekasan the Cavalry singing was abolished whereas in 1863 as a result of the change of government the Pamekasan corps was reorganized and from that moment on it would be managed by the State. The regent only has an obligation to provide people who voluntarily enter the corps to become officers, officers and soldiers. The members of this corps are all voluntary members of the population from the three regions because each member of the line, both officers and officers and ordinary soldiers, after completing their duty does not stay overnight in military barracks, but return to their respective places of residence for work as ordinary residents namely farming, raising livestock or making various handicrafts.

Various considerations regarding the policies that had to be taken by the colonial government ultimately led to the need for increased security in Java and Madura. The way that is considered the fastest and easiest way to do that is by empowering security services from various parties who were recruited from among the Dutch people themselves and from the indigenous population. This recruitment was based on government reports (colonial verslagen) which contained a list of perpetrators and acts of riots and crimes he had committed which had been decided by the bumiputera court from 1858 to 1896.

3. Discussion about the existence of the Barisan Madura Corps

Starting from the empowerment of recruiting security service personnel from among the indigenous population which has been done for a long time, especially in Java, has caused a lot of debate within the internal government itself. This debate in essence is about the emergence of a sense of concern in the government that someday the existence of the corps of the reserve forces will harm the government itself. They have the potential to become a threat because it is based on the idea that if the indigenous population is adept at using weapons then they will definitely carry out a movement that leads to a rebellion against the government. Therefore the selection of Madurese to be trained as security assistance is based on a special consideration that is because the Madurese are considered to have a more independent nature and risk-taking compared to the Javanese population.¹¹ This myth about the nature of Madurese people is related to their enjoyment of the characters who are often shown wayang namely Balarama and Pak Sakerah. The first figure describes the Madurese priyayi character and the second character is the character of the majority of the population who are considered as small people. Both of them are often told in puppet shows where if they are disturbed they will surely react by throwing a tantrum and becoming violent.

The implementation of the resolution for the three regions in Madura is not concurrent. The agreement that had taken place between the Dutch government and the Pamekasan Panembahan and Sultan Sumenep was further realized with the issuance of a resolution dated 29 September 1831, no. 2. In this case the Pamekasan Panembahan was required, among others, to provide assistance to the corps of the ranks consisting of two military singers consisting of one artillery unit and one cavalry unit.

¹⁰ In 1831 there were 1262 people attacked by smallpox died 413. In 1832 there were 2498 attacked by smallpox died 51. In 1833 attacked by 2348 died 45. In 1834 attacked by smallpox 3032 died 10. In 1835 was attacked by smallpox 2050 died 4. See D. Schoute. "De Geneeskundige in Nederlandsch-Indie gedurende de negentiende eeuw. Assistant-Residentie Madoera", in *GTNI*. No. 75. 1935, p. 406-411.

¹¹ G.J. Van Kooten, "De Madoereesche Werving en de Korpsen Barisan", dalam *IMT*, Zestiende Jaargang No. 7-12 (Batavia: G. Kolff & Co, 1885), p.4

This whole corps of forces totaling 386 people led by a Dutch officer as instructor and trainer in the military field. Besides that, the Dutch government also gave a guarantee to Pamekasan Panembahaan in the form of debt relief and tax exemption for several years. Then for the Sumenep sultan, based on the resolution, he was obliged to provide 180 corps of personnel consisting of five singers armed with rifles and one singer armed with spear weapons. The details of the Barisan corps are as follows:

The large staff consists of 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 3 Major, and 1 Captain's Aide.

Small staff consists of: 1 Major Aide, and 1 Major Tambur.

One infantry singer consists of: 1 Captain, 1 First Lieutenant, 2 Second Lieutenant, 1 Sergeant Major (except soldier armed with spear guns), 4 Sergeants, 8 Corporals, 2 Drummers (trumpets in cavalry), and 150 soldiers. In addition the Dutch government also added 1 Dutch Officer, 1 Low Aide, and 4 Low Officers.

At the same time, for the first time the government will provide various facilities and weapons to the Barisan corps in Sumenep. One of the most important things that must always be upheld by all members of the Barisan corps is that the task that must be carried out by them is to assist government forces in warfare that is not limited to the regions of Java and Madura, but rather to cover all areas under the territory of the Dutch East Indies government. In this task, the Barisan corps outside Madura related to the necessary facilities will still be borne by the Dutch government.

The structure and strength of the Barisan of the corps personnel became clearer after the government issued a resolution of 29 September 1831, no. 2 in it there is information as contained in the table below.

Table 1.

Barisan Corps Structure in 1831

Specifications	Bangkalan		Sumenep		Pamekasan	
	Officer	Soldier	Officer	Soldier	Officer	Soldier
Infantry staff	8	2	5	2	2	2
Horsemen	24	1008	20	845	8	254
Artillery	4	61	4	61		
Pioner	4	168	4	169	4	60
Pikiene	4	80	4	169		
numbers	44	1.310	37	1.346	14	316

Kuntowijoyo: *Perubahan Sosial Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940*, p. 148

Starting from the first time the formation of a corps of ranks in Madura which received a positive response from the Madurese population, in the subsequent development the status of being a member of this rank was one of the promising occupations because it was generally known that the conditions of agricultural land there were limited and not fertile. Becoming a member of the march corps is considered one way out to reduce poverty among the population. On the other hand, the Dutch government preferred to choose Madurese over military means. By providing sufficient military education, the government felt confident that the existence of the ranks corps would be able to become reinforcements for government professional forces.

In its development, in order to turn this corps into a professional military unit, it must be continuously carried out institutional reform training. Also in terms of supervision, this corps also needs to be monitored continuously in accordance with the level of levels in it. Government regulations issued in 1885 at the same time as the implementation of the government system directly in Madura by the Dutch government also simultaneously regulates the existence of the Madura corps. This corps will then be under direct supervision by the government. With this change in command system, the march corps directly under the command of the government caused the regents to no longer have power over this corps so that they could not intervene again in determining a policy related to this corps. Related to this, the direct command system also facilitates the government in conducting surveillance of armed forces in districts in the Madura residency. The government in this case can measure the strengths and weaknesses of these armed forces. Besides that, the government will also easily take action to reduce the rebellion that might arise and the regents no longer have great access to military forces that were previously under the command of their commanders. Related to the potential of the corps of the ranks to carry out movements vertically it was also very difficult because most of the

members were residents made into militias, while the officers were always held by Dutchmen who came from the professional military service and some Madurese nobles. Under these circumstances, the possibility of rebellion by the members of the corps of the ranks themselves was very small.

If a corps member wants to gain vertical mobility for his career development, this must be done with hard struggle as related to education level and work performance. The existence of a strong march corps as desired by the government was indeed in accordance with the initial purpose of its formation, namely as a means of defense balance in the Dutch East Indies that could be used at any time needed by the government. Another benefit gained by the government is that the government can carry out proper supervision and enforce various regulations that serve to curb and control the ranks of the corps. This restraint is mainly in the form of strict military discipline which is believed to be able to form a great sense of responsibility and if this is violated then members who commit these violations will receive a generally accepted punishment in the military world. As long as the existence of this line of corps is still directly under the government, it is as if it can be concluded that this corps will not be considered as a threat, but rather as a pro-government force. .

The issue of the Madura corps which functioned as a means of political balance became a matter of consideration in the Dutch East Indies defense commission so that it was decided to carry out reforms into a professional military unit. The basic consideration for the immediate reorganization of the corps is that the corps is considered by the government to be outdated, the fundamental improvement of the corps prioritized is mainly in terms of improving combat capability and instilling strong military values. For this purpose, there is ongoing debate in the Parliament (Volksraad), so that the objectives to be achieved will produce satisfying results.

Actually the idea to reorganize the corps has long been proposed by the indigenous government but did not get a satisfactory response due to the financial constraints faced by the government. The Dutch East Indies government after successfully integrating various regulations in Madura then immediately tried to reorganize the corps or with no large costs. One of the problems that is considered as a major difficulty in recruiting prospective members of the ranks corps is due to the existence of a payroll system in the form of farmland rice fields. Income derived from the yield of agricultural land is not sufficient to meet the cost of living from the shortage. Payroll in the form of money is then applied both to all members of the regular rank corps and to its officers.

Other points of reorganization are in the case of voluntary recruitment of prospective members of the Barisan on the condition that after they are accepted, they will receive a premium with a five-year work term. In addition, members are given money for warrior benefits beyond the monthly salary of low ranking officers and ordinary soldiers who carry out guard and training duties using weapons. Provision of pension money is also carried out for lowly officers and ordinary soldiers who have served for 20 years and for members who have experienced special incidents such as disobeying or becoming victims during their official duties. The administrative system and the instructions of the corps remained as before, that is, the full responsibility of the unitary force remained to be borne by the leadership of the rank of officer.¹² Reorganization of the corps is considered urgent to be done because of adjustments to existing conditions and situations. The practice of recruiting members of the ranks is not an oppression of the Madurese people so that this will create a sense of justice among the members of the Barisan.¹³

At that time some members of the Barisan received a small salary in cash, but the majority was in the form of land. Related to the salary in the form of land at that time if it is leased for one year it will generate around 25 to 30 guilders. Related to the implementation of the conversion of Madura into Dutch territory, all land ownership rights are individual so that the lands that have been allocated to the Barisan corps are also maintained. With this payment method, for the state finances remain light and at the same time members of the Barisan are also freed to pay taxes. After the reorganization of the Barisan corps was carried out, the agenda for meeting the budgetary needs was truly effective. It is estimated that important efforts to renew a march corps from various planned considerations include:

1. All Barisan corps are directly under the Ministry of War and regulated under military law.
2. The abolition of forced recruitment of members of the Barisan of the corps must be replaced by voluntary

¹² F.A. Cox, "De Barisan Korpsen in Verband met Uitingen Erover in den Volksraad. Een Barisan Reserve", dalam *IMT*, 62. 1931, 35

¹³ G.J. Van Kooten, *op.cit.*, p. 7

recruitment. 3. Salaries in the form of land grants are made to be improved and adjusted to their level or rank. In this case, it is sought that after running the service for 12, 18, to 24 years, a plot of land on Madura island must be given with full ownership status to replace the pension. The payment of salaries which is realized in the form of granting land is under the authority of the military and when he retires besides being his right is also the authority of the domestic government. 4. The Madura corps is already as in the army, the command line must be under the supervision of Dutch officers and cadres of officers. These Dutch officers earned salaries from the army and lived in a house like those occupied by wealthy people or like royalty in Madura. This must be provided in stages for officers who are currently carrying out their duties will be dismissed from their service by obtaining a pension based on the length of service and must be large enough to be able to live properly. 5. Soon a corps was formed by merging two singers in Sampang, joining two Pamekasan singers and centering in Pamekasan. Whereas the corps in Bangkalan and Sumenep were also merged so that each consisted of four singers. In this way, there were three corps in total, each consisting of four singers, bringing the total number of Barisan in Madura to 12 singers. 6. Regarding the accommodation system in a military service, it has not been implemented ideally. Existing regulations were immediately put in place provided that the rows' residence should not be more than three miles away from the armory. 7. Regarding the weapons, they must be stored in a warehouse and treated according to needs. In addition, the provision of uniforms for members of the Barisan must be more than one because apart from being used in the ministry if there are additional personnel with the new corps, it must go through a contract agreement, so that the cost of retirement must be calculated. 8. In order to create a professional defense institution, each health corps is immediately assigned a health officer with a salary of around 200 to 300 guilders every month, equipped with a treatment room and a number of employees as needed. In addition, an office chief officer was assigned to take care of all administrative and various non-military interests.

Although the reformation of the Barisan had to be realized according to plan until 1887, because it was considered to show a high level of loyalty towards the Netherlands, it also had an impact on administrative innovation that was so slow.¹⁴ Starting from this, a total reorganization or renewal of the ranks was immediately pursued through a decree dated April 4, 1891, no. 12, especially the most important is in terms of budgeting funds. Based on experience in using funds in previous years the proposed formation is actually f. 190,000, - for each year, but in reality what was successfully sucked up was f. 85,000, - so it is thought to have an unprofessional impact on the capabilities of the Barisan. If after issuing a decree concerning reorganization of the Barisan, it can be budgeted in total for f. 233,000, until 1889, the hopes for the formation of professional ranks were very encouraging.¹⁵ The renewal that must begin to be addressed was realizing the Madurese Barisan to become military forces in the Dutch East Indies, also to prepare the level of military education for native officers. With a decree issued on April 4, 1891, no. 2, the contents of which were immediately formed by the intensive training of Madurese Barisan for the education of would-be soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers with standards according to the regular army. Various possible possibilities for militias in Madura, based on Article 9, paragraph 1, dated April 4, 1891, no. 2 is a provision for the appointment of first officer with the rank of Second Lieutenant, a candidate must fulfill the following requirements:¹⁶

1. Good attitude.
2. Having 4 years of service with the last 2 years must be a Low-Level Candidate Officer.
3. Has marching knowledge: including various troop formations in a battle.
4. Rules regarding weapons and ammunition.
5. Shooting rules for infantry troops.
6. Government service regulations in terms of troop assistance.
7. Ganisun official regulations.
8. Quiet rules of field service.
9. Understanding the geographical conditions of the field which includes the ability to read maps, scales, field sketches, and exploration of the area.
10. Skills in finding materials contained in the surrounding area for making fortifications in the

14 ANRI (National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia), Verbaal 17 Djuli 1888, No. 49., "Kort overzicht der voornaamste bescheiden betreffende de Barisan van Madoera".

15 F.A. Cox, op.cit., p.137

16 F.L.W. Raedt van Oldenbarnevelt, "De Korpsen Barisan van Madoera: opleiding, betaling, oefeningen" dalam IMT, No. 3., 1907, p. 449

field appropriately.

11. Understand passwords using flags.
12. Rules regarding revolver weapons.
13. Regulations on military honor.
14. Rules for self-protection by using bayonets and swords.
15. Military rules and regulations.
16. Mastering the science of numeracy.
17. Able to speak, read and write in Malay.

Associated with being able to speak Dutch for an officer is expected to be able to add a lot of knowledge about military matters through various existing reading books. Although it has been practiced regarding the opening of a Dutch language course. In Pamekasan and Sumenep, members of the Barisan who would take the rank of officer did not seem to have the ideal results, so they had to change with urgent needs, namely being able to speak Malay and write Latin letters.

In addition to seeking to form a professional infantry force immediately, namely the number of officers of the Barisan of the members of the line played by the natives, then at the same time in the development of training can already be done by native officers. Regarding the formation of the ranks of soldiers and non-commissioned officers the Dutch government still needs because of the survival of the militias in Madura. Therefore according to article 26 besluit 4 April 1891, no. 2 then the requirements for the rank of Corporal are as follows:

1. Have a good attitude and behavior.
2. Mastering the rules of the line of marching.
 1. Mastering the theory and practice among them about weapons and ammunition and training.
 2. Knowing the rules regarding service duties in the field and in the garrison, including guard duty and duty of the campment.
3. Understanding Malay simply.

Then related to article 27, besluit 4 April 1891, no. 2 for the requirements to be a Sergeant among them is

- a. Have a good attitude and behavior.
- b. Mastering the line rules line up.
- c. Mastering theory and practice including weapons, ammunition and training.
- d. Mastering the regulations regarding service assignments in the field and in the garrison, including guard duty and task assignment.
- e. Able to speak, read in Malay and write Latin letters.

With the start of tight regulations in the Barisan, it seems to have an effect on the requirements for becoming Barisan. Reforms that began to be felt, for example, in terms of being in line, that is, it must be a bonding system that is divided through the short term (cortical verband), and the long term (lange verband). A short-term bond is two years long, while a long-term bond is five years. This verband lang group gets a premium of 20 guilders, while the verband cortis is 10 guilders. If the contract period has expired, then you can continue as a member just now must get a letter of recommendation from a doctor. Based on these requirements, not all residents can become members of the ranks, because in addition to having a healthy provision letter, they are also around 18 to 22 years of age, able to read, write, and be able-bodied.

If someone wants to join the Barisan, a series of announcements have been made verbally delivered from the old rank members to other people or the community. Residents who intend to become members of the Barisan can register to the military barracks, and are ready with the conditions that are stipulated by the Dutch.

The selection system adopted by new Barisan members shows that not all residents can become members of the Barisan. Selection of members of the Barisan has become a matter of pride for those who are chosen, because it can outperform fellow rivals. Their pride is also shown because when it is difficult to get a job, there is hope for a decent life.

Someone who is accepted as a member of the Barisan can get enough income to meet the needs of daily life,. Details of the salaries of Barisan members in the 1890s based on article 28 dated April 4, 1891, no. 2 are as follows:

Table 2.

List of salaries of members of the Barisan of the 1890s based on rank

Major	200 gulden
Captain	100 gulden
First Lieutenant	60 gulden
Second Lieutenant	40 gulden
Low-ranking Officer Aide	20 gulden
Sergeant major	12 gulden
Sergeant, Subordinate Officer	10 gulden
Corporal	6 gulden
Tambur batter and Trumpet blower	4 gulden

F.L.W. Raedt van Oldenbarnevelt "De Korpsen Barisan van Madoera:opleiding, betaling, oefeningen", IMT, 38. 1907, No.1, p. 45

In addition to the salary breakdown list as nominal in accordance with the table relating to inactive members of the Barisan due to illness and reasons for leave, it also still gets two-thirds of the base salary. In addition to the basic salary that must be given to members of the Barisan, the improvement of income is also still being considered because with article 29 dated April 4, 1891, no. 2 is set about the amount of daily allowances for Barisan. Low ranking officers receive an additional 0.30 guilders, a corporal 0.25 guilders, a tambour batter 0.25 guilders, a trumpeter blower 0.20 guilders, and an ordinary soldier 0.20 guilders. This shopping money is paid every day.

The Barisan corps commander and Lieutenant Aide also received a food allowance of 1.5 guilders each month. Meanwhile, if a soldier is appointed as a Barisan officer with the rank of Second Lieutenant, the person concerned will receive gratuities of 250 guilders. Besides that, each year also has the right to receive an allowance in the form of uniform money of 55 guilders, for officers with the rank of Captain of 70 guilders and for the rank of Major 100 guilders. A Low-ranking Officer Aide when appointed in accordance with his rank is entitled to receive gratuities of 200 guilders annually and a uniform allowance of 45 guilders is added. Starting with the improvement of income as referred to in Article 29, when calculated in detail for the living expenses of an officer, it reaches more than 250 guilders each month. Of course, a low ranking Second Lieutenant officer and still have to rent a residence is paid 40 guilders every month, it will be difficult to be able to pay off his debt of 250 guilders. In addition, in the case of promotion to promotion, it has never been smooth sailing, in the case of Bangkalan there are as many as two people with the rank of Second Lieutenant who have served for six years and have not been promoted. In fact there are also two people with the rank of Captain for 14 years from the previous rank.

Various complaints were often raised by coach instructors who generally held the rank of captain to the Barisan corps commander. Complaints generally occur in the spread of debts to anyone who has a lot of money, so it is considered not ideal for a Madurese corps. This salary improvement is always sought, then based on article 33, dated April 4, 1891, No.2. a Major officer each month gets a salary of 275 guilders, 175 guilders Captain, First Lieutenant 100 guilders, and Second Lieutenant 75 guilders. In addition, they also received additional gratuity money for uniforms each year amounting to 100 to 400 guilders.¹⁷

After improvements in the income sector as well as the salary provided, various reports given to Fokkens residents recognized that the Barisan Madura showed a significant level of enthusiasm and professional value. Evidence of this is: in the case of training from 1910 in May to November the frequency is done every day or for five days a week except Friday and Sunday. Then for the months of November to May the next period is conducted for two days each week. Therefore, if it is counted for one year, then the exercise is done on average for three and a half days for each week. So this is in accordance with standards in military institutions in general.¹⁸

¹⁷ F.A. Cox, *op.cit.*, p.140

¹⁸ H.G.E. Granpre Moliere, "De Barisan Korpsen in verband met eene toekomstige inlandsche militair als leger reserve", dalam *IMT, Vijf en Veertigste Jaargang*, No. 76 (Batavia: Weltreveden: G. Kolf & Co, 1914), p.10

Related to loyalty the Madurese Barisan also showed high loyalty towards the Dutch government. It is proven that the Barisan have never carried out defiance as has always been feared from various previous issues. This was acknowledged by a Dutch instructor, Major Fremerij, that for two and a half years he had led the organic power of the Madurese corps that had been sanctioned for just under 10 out of 676 members. Other evidence is also shown that when the turmoil occurred by the leader of the Sarekat Islam party in 1913, the Sumenep corps along with the assistant resident visited the small islands around Madura, to calm the population and not show the slightest want to turn around to help attack the Netherlands.

4. From indigenous militias to semi-professional military

After the announcement of the Report of the State Commission for the Defense of the Dutch East Indies, there were many voices and writings in the military that related to the need for defense of the Indies. This was certainly done in the context of saving the government budget which would eventually arrive at a simpler reorganization of the Dutch East Indies forces. Various ways from various parties in this matter have also been tried to be able to meet the needs of our troops against members who come from among the population of Europe because this is indeed a great hope. However, the various parties also realized that various methods were not possible to realize this desire. They also can not deny that in the future it must be given even greater opportunities for the indigenous population to become members of our troops and up to now this has been done even though it is still in the initial stages in the form of indigenous population militias.

As I have repeatedly stated that the Dutch East Indies were in a condition where inevitably recruitment of troops from the indigenous population (ie Javanese and Madurese) was in any form and whatever obstacles existed. If not all people know about this problem, then on this occasion as quoted from the State Commission Report mentioned above, especially in the Chapter 9 section on "National Defense", which outlines the following matters.

First of all, attention must be paid to the fact that the indigenous forces in our troops must receive intensive training and strong discipline and after having practical experience in the field, according to the regulations at the end of their first service period for 6 years, the relevant eligible is considered a member of our army. So in this case there is no need for further explanation that training and education of indigenous militias must be carried out immediately. Even this is expected to provide little military value but it is absolutely necessary to overcome its shortcomings and backwardness. Now the overall strength of the army as a whole depends not only on its quantity but mainly on its quality. The lack of military values was then seen as negative for the organization of the militia forces. Regarding the above, namely the implementation of indigenous militias until now there has been no reporting on various political and administrative objections. This is also considered as a notification at the same time. The political objection in this regard is that the Javanese population tends to have a dislike of military matters and if a system of coercion is to be implemented, it is feared that it will become a source of seeds of growing opposition to the power of the Dutch government.

Moreover, various practical objections that arose were that in the Dutch East Indies there were no non-European population groups who were truly prepared to fulfill the requirements in implementing the militia system. Thus there is no one right way to get a good benchmark in terms of recruitment of mandatory militias and an appropriate control to fulfill military service. Finally, in the Commission consideration is being made on the idea of expanding the scope of the population to be armed in a primitive manner like the Barisan corps in Madura. The State Commission through its 2 members can provide an explanation of the military values contained in the Barisan corps and they can answer questions from other members about it and about advice from former Resident Madura F. Fokkens which is complete in Appendix 16 from this State Commission Report.

The concluding consideration of the suggestions and advice above is that the existing Barisan corps should be retained but in its expansion of course further review is needed. However minimal the military values of the Barisan corps were, of course, still lower than those of the militias with a training period of 2 years. Of course, with the proposed formation of such a force and the expansion of the strength of the existing permanent forces will result in an increase in the defense budget. With this condition, it seems that the hope that the Java Corps corps to be formed will have military values that

are stronger than the Madura corps will not be realized because the nature of the Javanese population in general in relation to warfare is lower than that of the Madurese population. Therefore, as a final conclusion, the formation of a militia force and the expansion of an armed population group must be seen as a pioneering formation of a permanent force in addition to our existing troops and that permanent forces can at any time be used as replacements for our permanent troops. The government has given a signal of approval and if something does not start immediately while the time will continue to run then everything will be too late.

In connection with the high level of loyalty of the Barisan, in this case as stated by the former Resident Fokkens himself in a report he made. It was stated that at the time of the riots and riots in Madura which resulted in the occupation of Sampang by fanatical population groups in 1895 it turned out that the Barisan corps did not take the attitude of committing treason and siding with the population. Without any hesitation, a detachment of the Barisan was ordered to stop the riots and succeed in arresting as many as 20 people who triggered the riot. In addition they are also very active in helping the police to arrest riot leaders who are considered by the population to be "holy men". Also in 1913 it can be read in various newspapers that a section of the Baremen Soemenep departed together with the Assistant Resident officials to the small islands around Madura to calm the turmoil caused by some Sarekat Islam leaders who of course also started with the same incident in Bangkalan. In the book written by the former Resident Madoera de Munnick (titled "My official period") is told about the Barisan in Bangkalan that can be trusted and proven in 1881 when the government carried out the removal of apanage lands as a follow-up to the implementation of the government model directly by the Dutch government they remain loyal behind us even though the situation at that time was chaotic and almost out of control because many European officials who tried to leave Madura with various official reasons such as Assistant Resident officials asked permission for sick leave to Java, the president of the court also went permission to Surabaya and the instructor captain requested that he be dismissed with respect from his service and so forth.

Based on the aforementioned popularity and the high level of loyalty of the Barisan corps which has been shown with various evidence, namely first came from a Major General Staff H. de Fremerij (see his article in *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 1913 No.2 and in the *De Java Bode* newspaper published January 4, 1913 and so on) which basically states: "Why should we look for something new when we already have it and we just need to expand it a little for improvements and improvements". Other evidence was provided by Van den Bosch, Van Gagem and the current Chief of Staff of the General who all stated that the Barisan corps had more opportunities to be incorporated into the Dutch East Indies army structure as a kind of reserve army compared to the recruitment of members of the indigenous militia by force.

Who does not know the fragrance of the name of the Madurese military forces in the various wars we waged? Who has ever known Madurese people closely? Anyone who had known Madurese infantry singers in our army before the war in Aceh and now is no longer certain would admit that these Madurese had abilities as members of the army far above the capabilities of Javanese troops.

Madurese have a more independent nature and are brave enough to take risks even though it is well known that from their body language it is already reflected by itself. Regarding this matter which is related to military interests, it is often not considered by the Ministry of Home Affairs as the interests of the State. If people think otherwise, in making efforts to recruit members of the troops, of course they can collaborate with indigenous leaders and officials who are certainly easier to do among the residents of their own villages. Surely this way you will get far better results. If in this case people then make sufficient announcements to the villagers regarding the recruitment of prospective members of the military along with the requirements that must be met then it is likely to get good results with the large number of people who voluntarily register.

In Pamekasan there had been an incident where a man who wanted to enlist in the army was opposed by a native official and this had long-lasting consequences. In Bangkalan there was a man who intended to register as a member of the military and while he was waiting in front of the office of the Resident Assistant to obtain a certificate of good conduct and for this purpose at that time the required condition was to bring a letter of introduction from religious leaders in the place of residence concerned. This recommendation became an important matter so that an officer who was given the task of recruiting members of the army made a stipulation that the village head or village head who

succeeded in recruiting his citizens to become military members would receive a reward of f.10, - for each candidate he successfully recruited. Even though this has been applied for a long time, it does not produce better results because it is not widely publicized. To solve this problem, an instructor captain in Bangkalan tried to make a new breakthrough by installing many pamphlets announcing the recruitment of prospective troops along the public road. This announcement pamphlet is made of wooden boards and written in Madurese which is installed on market days where many people will be doing their activities in the markets there. In this way it turned out that the recruitment carried out in Bangkalan gave very good results.

However, if this is true, of course now the troops' needs for Madurese members have been satisfactorily fulfilled, but apparently this has not been achieved and especially since mid-1884 the recruitment carried out in Bangkalan could not meet the target. And if this continues to happen, then the thinking that developed as stated before in regard to the expansion of Madurese members in the Dutch East Indies army will never be realized.

This voluntary recruitment model for soldiers is indeed a principle that will be maintained for the time being and in our opinion it can be done in two ways. The first method is the formation of new military garrisons in several areas, namely in Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep by eliminating the existing corps of ranks in accordance with the principles which will then be handled by the indigenous government.

Anyone who is very well acquainted with the situation in Madura will declare his agreement if the existence of this Barisan corps can be directly incorporated into the Dutch East Indies army structure but we will wait for the right opportunity to discuss the Barisan again. When important areas in Madura were considered to be the time for a military garrison to be established and after which European and indigenous officials were given authority by the Government to recruit members of the army, this would give better results. And if important regulations relating to various consequences have been successfully formulated and enforced such as in the case of increases in advances, premiums given to indigenous leaders, permits to wear shoes to members of the Madura military, capital loans in the form of land after carrying out the period for 12 years or 20 years, the granting of individual land ownership rights and so on, there is no doubt that the results to be recruited will be even better.

There has been no longer a difference of opinion regarding the discourse of abolition of the Barisan corps and all of them expressed their agreement. The purpose of the formation of the Barisan corps in the past half century related to the interests of the kraton in Madura no longer has a strong reason because now there is no more royal government in Madura anymore. Besides that, the existence of this corps is often used by certain parties for personal purposes and criminal crime so that it is clear that the current conditions and conditions are no longer relevant to the existence of the Barisan.

If at present this requirement has been fulfilled, in principle there are no objections to receiving and resuming the inheritance of the Madurese kings, but it is well known that Barisan members have for a long time only been volunteers and also their officers. nothing comes from ordinary people. Then how is the way carried out by the Barisan corps in recruiting prospective members? The answer is very easy and simple, that is, the recruitment is carried out coercively against the villagers who have been living quietly and peacefully despite their shortcomings and mediocre conditions. They had no choice but to accept and be willing to become members of the Barisan. If this method is unsuccessful, this method of coercion is carried out using gun violence. Thus in Bangkalan afdeeling as many as 11 villages around the city of Bangkalan were obliged to take turns sending their male population to become members of the Barisan. Every male villager is subject to this obligation and if any of them try to avoid this obligation, for example by moving to another village, the person concerned will be arrested and detained.¹⁹

Whether by now becoming a member of the Barisan will provide enough income to someone, then his fate will still not be good because during running service in the line then a member will be very busy and do not have more time to be able to do other jobs such as processing paddy fields are usually located in a place far enough. The income of a man who is a member of the Barisan is no more than receiving a plot of land for cultivation, which, if leased, is worth about f.25, up to f.30, for each year. To

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13-15

carry out their duties every day must spend money of 10 money so they are forced to rent out their rice fields at prices below the normal price. After serving in the ministry for 20 years to 30 years they will be terminated by not receiving a monthly pension and returning living life in a state of shortage, even this also happens to the Barisan officers themselves who have a relatively higher position than ordinary members.

No matter how small the amount needed by a Madurese to provide for his daily life, one would immediately say that with such an income would certainly not be enough to meet the needs of everyday life even if only for one man. However, when a man is married, he will of course have children. It is fortunate that in the lives of indigenous people they have become accustomed to living in poverty so that this problem does not lead to more severe conditions in the Barisan corps.

Now there are symptoms that are limited to the main things, the first is that the takeover of the Barisan is an important and urgent matter to be carried out immediately. Second, it is suspected that there are symptoms with many Barisan members trying to get out of their membership. As many as more than 2/3 of the Barisan members in Bangkalan did not attend the training and each year there were around 200 members who disappeared and tried to flee to other areas.

With such circumstances people then ask: "Will people let things like that continue to happen? Madurese residents also have the same rights to obtain protection as other residents. Why are Madurese people treated arbitrarily by being given a heavy burden and becoming guinea pigs from the compulsory labor of the Barisan that they hate? And compulsory labor during peacetime is not a military service but rather as compulsory labor for urban defense. This kind of thing had never been done to the inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies anywhere. People say that the Government must be responsible for the ongoing situation and the Government must take over the entire Madura region into a direct government as well as the residency in Java.

In this case what is different is the consideration from a military point of view that starts from a question: "Does the Barisan corps as it is today have enough military values or is it still in the stage to obtain it? This question has actually been answered many times by itself in many military journals where in essence the military values are doubtful because in the formation of the first time there was no idea about it.

They might be lucky people in a situation that is also happy, what can be expected from people like this? what is related to dedication, willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of others and so on? Some of them might look good in a parade and an inspection but an experienced instructor will be able to quickly know that they have no military values and have no discipline, their appearance is lacking and only get physical training. The civil authorities who were the superiors of the Barisan corps could do little more than just form a parody that required them to become a military corps.

Also from a political and military point of view the existence of the Madura Barisan corps as well as the existing ones is no longer appropriate. If people now still want to maintain the existence of the Barisan, then surely there must be a reorganization of this corps, the law must be respected, the population is no longer oppressed and also the basic principles in which the Barisan institutions are carried out calmly and fairly. In conjunction with military demands, it is possible to make this Barisan corps more disciplined, able to be used and get better training. To achieve all this, the changes made must be gradual and not arbitrary. To begin with, it would be better if an experiment was conducted on one corps.

As is known that at this time the existence of the Barisan consists of three infantry corps which oversees as many as 13 singers.

The Bangkalan Corps consisted of 6 singers, the Corps in Sumenep consisted of 5 singers and the Corps in Pamekasan consisted of 2 singers.

The members of the corps received a small portion in cash and mostly in the form of land. The lands then they are rented to the people who process them and the results of these rentals become the salary change.

With the conversion of Madura into the Government's domain, all land ownership rights will be individual but the lands intended for members of the Barisan corps are retained. With this payment method, it is certainly very easy for the state finances and cheap because the members of the corps get paid in the form of paddy fields and in accordance with the regulations, the paddy fields are also

exempt from their tax payment obligations. The important actions that must now be taken to form a new Barisan corps according to our thinking are as follows:

1. All Corps are directly under the Ministry of War and regulated under military law.
2. The abolition of forced recruitment of service to members of the Barisan and replaced with the recruitment of volunteers as has been applied in the army so far without obtaining additional wages.
3. Payment of salaries in the form of granting land is repaired and adjusted to the level or rank, for example after carrying out official duties properly for 12 years, 18 years or 24 years, a plot of land is granted on the island of Madura with full ownership status when they retire. From an agrarian point of view this does not contradict existing rules and ownership rights to this land are important to be the foundation of life for members of the Barisan who have retired from his official service. The payment of salaries which is realized in the form of land management results is under the authority of the military and when he retires and becomes his right, it will become the authority of the Domestic government.
4. Corps as in the army are under the supervision of European officers and cadres. They will get paid from the army and live in a house like that occupied by wealthy and respected people in Madura or royal descent. This must be carried out gradually and the officers who are currently carrying out their official duties will be dismissed from their service and obtain a pension based on the length of their service years and the number is large enough to be able to live properly.
5. In Sampang 2 Barisan singers were formed which together with 2 singers in Pamekasan became one corps and Barisan in Bangkalan and in Sumenep were merged into each consisting of 4 singers. Thus, overall there are 3 corps, each consisting of 4 singers. The total number of singers is 12 singers.
6. The placement system in a military service is not implemented. Existing regulations still apply but with restrictions that the residence of members of the Barisan should not be more than 3 pal away from the armory. Weapons, as is the case today, are still stored in warehouses and necessary care is taken, but uniforms must be provided to members and officers of the Barisan natives in more than one amount, that is, to be used at that time and the other instead.
7. Making a softer transitional regulation which among other things regulates that members of the Barisan who are currently currently serving when a new corps is formed must go through a contract in which the conditions of good health and the length of the previous service period will be taken into account in in retirement later.
8. In each corps a health officer is added with a treatment room and a number of employees as needed. In addition, an office chief officer was assigned to take care of all administrative and non-military interests.

5. Conclusions

Until the change of modern Dutch East Indies government policy, namely the reorganization of the bureaucracy that began in 1857 was the implementation of a direct government system with the main mission of the colonies being a *winstgewest* or as a foothold to be exploited by the parent country. However, Madura island with its infertile soil conditions *kultuurstelsel* cannot be practiced, so that there is a big difference with Java, especially the practice of local bureaucratic behavior which is still not much different from the previous period and this brings a special historical journey as well.

The Dutch government's policy has had an impact that can fill the history of Madura. One side although the island of Madura is not a promising area for natural resources in the agro-industrial sector, but can still be expected related to the recruitment of security assistance as the role of the corps is very supportive in the Dutch military expedition to help carry out the pacification of other areas, especially in outside Java who opposed the Dutch government. One of the sources of food exploitation is estimated to be only a supply of salt, thus confirming that ultimately the Dutch government is very concerned, even this industry has become a very complex event in Madura.

The formation of the Barisan Madura corps by the Dutch East Indies colonial government was the right decision to fill the vacancies of military members who were at that time. As it is known that various ways from various parties in this matter have also been tried to be able to meet the needs of government forces, especially from the European population because this is indeed a priority of the

government. However, the various parties also realized that various methods were not possible to realize this desire. They also can not deny that in the future it must be given even greater opportunities for the indigenous population to become members of government forces and up to now this has been done even though it is still in the initial stages, namely in the form of indigenous population militias.

Why do the government forces not try to take various other steps as has been done by various other departments in order to meet the needs of professionals in their fields from the indigenous population. In this case what is meant is the establishment of vocational education institutions namely STOVIA to educate indigenous doctors, colleges in the fields of law, agriculture, veterinary medicine and so forth. Also do not forget that government forces need native officers for the fields of infantry, health and of course this will be realized if the native population is given the opportunity to enter the Royal Military Academy education.

If in this case there are still differences of opinion then of course all of them will come to the same conclusion that all parties will agree to continue to maintain the existence of this Barisan Madura corps. The government feels that a strong effort must always be made to be able to form a militia that in the future will qualify as a member of a native voluntary force. If the recruitment of indigenous troops among the population itself is still considered as "something" that can be sold to the government, of course this will certainly make it more difficult for the recruitment of indigenous troops to volunteer. As it is known that in relation to the socio-economic conditions of the Madurese population, based on the conditions and conditions of the land in Madura which is largely infertile, Madurese have a large ability to adapt and are known to have a resilient nature. Thus, in this case the land factor is also still an important factor as the only hope to be able to sustain the lives of the population.

This is due to the fact that at the same time the demand for labor by the growing plantation industry is also increasing, also the expansion of the construction of the railroad and tramway network in Java and also in Sumatra will soon begin to be implemented (in the de Javabode newspaper April 7, 1914, it was stated that in the period of ½ years for the construction of the railroad line in South Sumatra, 8,000 workers were brought in from the Javanese population). In addition, the expansion of the opening of the plantation industry in areas outside Java will result in increasing demand for labor from Java for various fields of work available both as planting laborers and as security police. The Javanese who had been recruited as members of the government forces and other population groups such as Timorese and Ambonese were too few to meet the needs of these troop members whose presence spread throughout the Netherlands Indies.

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